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SUMMARY 
Redundancy management algorithms, commonly referred to as voters, are algo- 
rithms used in fault tolerant control systems to vote on incoming redundant data, 
isolate "bad" signals, and output a single ttgoodtt value. In a synchronous environ- 
ment, this algorithm is a straightforward signal-to-signal comparison with rela- 
tively low complexity. The technology of asynchronous control systems, recently 
realized in the Ultrareliable Fault Tolerant Control System research program at NASA 
Ames Research Center, requires more complex algorithms for fault detection and 
signal selection. A variety of algorithms used for this process, a means of testing 
them, and their basic performance under a simulated environment of the ultrareliable 
fault-tolerant control system are presented. 
INTRODUCTION 
The concept of redundancy mandates the use of some algorithm that will examine 
all incoming signals, decide which, if any, are failed, and output a reasonable 
signal (see fig. 1 ) .  This algorithm is referred to as a Redundancy Data Manager or 
voter. Many control systems have incorporated it and, subsequently, some type of 
voter has evolved (refs. 1-7). 
Because of the common clock in synchronous environments, redundant signals- are 
examined simultaneously. 
slight interference is used in comparing the redundant signals; and any value 
exceeding this limit is not considered for output selection. The choice of the 
midvalue of the remaining signals ensures that a valid signal is output. 
is simple, fast, and reliable, yet becomes completely invalid when transported into 
the asynchronous environment because of the skew in the associated times of the 
redundant signals. 
A predetermined tolerance level allowing for noise and 
This voter 
It is the technology of asynchronous redundancy which dictates the generation 
of voter algorithms whose designs require more thought than those in synchronous 
applications. Such is the case in the Ultrareliable Fault Tolerant Control System 
(UFTCS) project at NASA Ames Research Center (ref. 8), based on the previous work of 
Dunn and Meyer (refs. 9-11). Here, the voter is incorporated in the same environ- 
mental setup as in figure 1 ,  but the tasks A(i) each have different times associated 
with them, which are controlled by their own independent clocks (see fig. 2). In 
this configuration, the voter receives data values on each of the four pipelines, 
each tagged with a time by its own clock. 
ments, the values vary. 
the voter must determine which pipelines are still working and which, if any, are 
Since they come from independent ele- 
They all may or may not be valid. Based on these values, 
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Figure 1.- N-modular redundancy system (synchronous). 
not. It must also output a valid controlling value onto task B. This determination 
process may be by selection from those incoming data, by mathematical formula, or 
both. Nevertheless, it is the awareness of completely independent elements that 
dictates the use of a more complicated algorithm in this voter module. The voter 
must detect faults and generate valid signals based solely on the incoming asynchro- 
nous values. In the design of this algorithm one needs to consider the time differ- 
ences of the values and still be reliable at detecting actual faults. 
Many ideas were presented for this application, and a test was necessary to 
determine which of them would be reliable. A voter is reliable if it properly 
detects faults and outputs good data. It is not reliable if it: 
faults, 2) indicates faults on correctly working channels, 3)  detects faults prop- 
erly then later uses the faulted lines for output, and/or 4)  outputs bad data. 
of these possibilities must be noted and properly considered in voter design. 
1 )  fails to detect 
All 
A series of experiments was performed on various voter algorithms to determine 
their effectiveness in both detecting faults and outputting valid signals in the 
UFTCS. 
lating statistics on the voters' performances. These experiments, the tested 
voters, and comparative analysis results are presented. 
The study was performed using a software simulation of the system and calcu- 
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Figure 2.- Asynchronous redundant system. 
ULTRARELIABLE FAULT TOLERANT CONTROL SYSTEM DESCRIPTION 
The Ultrareliable Fault Tolerant Control System (UFTCS) concept using a systems 
design philosophy which allows development of system structures containing virtually 
no common elements was implemented at NASA Ames Research Center. 
provided the means for removing common system elements by permitting them to operate 
as independent, uncoupled entities. 
are run on dissimilar hardware, thus adhering to the independence criterion, 
this concept of independent operation of redundant system elements that mandates the 
use of a voter. 
This concept 
Multiple versions of the application program 
It is 
A typical UFTCS was constructed to investigate the theoretical and practical 
This system has 
bases of the concept with operational hardware and software. 
a UH-1H helicopter was implemented in this experimental testbed. 
proven highly successful in both laboratory and manned simulation testing, with 
several hundred simulated flight hours logged to date. 
is shown in figure 2 ,  with a sample consisting of 4 redundant pipelines coming from 
4 independent computers, 
The control system of 
The environment of the voter 
Each of these pipelines consist of 4 different control 
3 
signals, one for each of the 4 axes of the helicopter. Out of these 16 input sig- 
nals, the voter outputs 1 value for each of the 4 controls. The process is real- 
time with the voter receiving samples every 50 msec throughout the flight so as to 
control the helicopter's position. 
This specific implementation of the UFTCS was a test aid to demonstrate proof 
of concept and should not be viewed as an exclusive application. Ultrareliable 
Fault Tolerant Control System is a general concept which has applications to any 
control system to enhance its reliability. Similarly, the voters also are of a 
generic specification. 
VOTER CONCEPTS 
There are two types of redundancy classifications: static and dynamic. Static 
redundancy utilizes those voters which detect faults, isolates them, and outputs 
valid signals. Dynamic redundancy voters, after fault detection, diagnose and 
correct the faults detected (ref. 12) .  The voters reported on in this paper are 
designed for.static redundancy; therefore, they consist of two algorithms: fault 
detection/isolation and signal output. The internal purpose of fault detection/ 
isolation algorithms is to provide a flag and record for system maintenance of both 
permanent and intermittent faults experienced during flight operations (ref. 1). 
The signal output algorithm typically occurs after fault detection, thereby 
ensuring the consideration of only unfaulted signals as output. This part of the 
voter is usually referred to as signal selection. This title is characteristic of 
that in a synchronous environment, but is misleading when referring to its use in 
the asynchronous environment. 
values because they are not synchronized. 
routine, but also adds new considerations to the "signal selection" routine. 
Because of this, the underlying method of the signal selection routine varies frGm 
voter to voter. 
There tends to be a wider variation between the input 
This not only affects the fault detection 
The voters used in these experiments were composed by engineers working on the 
UFTCS project at Ames Research Center. Some have been altered, others have been 
eliminated because of poor algorithm design or lack of efficiency. Those presented 
do not necessarily represent all good available algorithms, but these were designed 
for this specific system by people intimately familiar with the project. 
The criteria that the voter designers had to observe were: 
1. There are four sets of inputs called pipelines, each pipeline consisting of 
four different control values and their respective times (asynchronous) 
Faults may be present on these inputs, taking on any form 
Voters are required to detect faults and output good values for each con- 
2. 
3 .  
trol; and 
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4.  The v o t e r  must complete  execut ion  w i t h i n  50 msec. 
I t  is t h i s  l as t  c r i t e r i o n  t h a t  restricts t h e  complexi ty  of the  v o t e r .  Not o n l y  
t h i s ,  b u t  t h i s  p r o c e s s i n g  time (referred to  as the  sampling ra te ) ,  can add t o  o r  
de t rac t  from the o v e r a l l  rel iabil i ty of the v o t e r  a n d ,  hence,  t he  e n t i r e  system 
( r e f .  8) .  With these i n  mind, the  fo l lowing  v o t e r s  were s u b m i t t e d :  
1 .  Midvalue Select ( M I D V A L )  
2. R e s i d u a l  Voter (RESID) 
3. F i r s t  Order E x t r a p o l a t o r  (FRSORD) 
4. Second Order E x t r a p o l a t o r  (SECORD) 
5. Thi rd  Order E x t r a p o l a t o r  (TRDORD) 
The midvalue select  and r e s i d u a l  v o t e r s  r e l y  on t he i r  f a u l t  d e t e c t i o n  schemes 
to  c o r r e c t l y  detect and isolate a l l  f a u l t s  t h a t  are p r e s e n t .  They t h e n  choose the  
o u t p u t  from the  remaining good v a l u e s .  The remainder  of the  v o t e r s  i n  t h i s  paper  
r e l y  t o  an  e x t e n t  on the  f a u l t  detection scheme, b u t  go one  s t e p  f u r t h e r  to  e n s u r e  
good o u t p u t .  For each c o n t r o l ,  t h e y  do n o t  s imply o u t p u t  t h e  c u r r e n t  v a l u e  from an 
u n f a u l t e d  p i p e l i n e ,  b u t  rather u s e  a n  u n f a u l t e d  p i p e l i n e  and e x t r a p o l a t e  to  t h e  end 
of the  frame and o u t p u t  t h i s  new v a l u e .  This idea was i n c o r p o r a t e d  t o  reduce  i n h e r -  
e n t  n o i s e  on the  p i p e l i n e  and ,  more s p e c i f i c a l l y ,  to o u t p u t  a good v a l u e  for the  
p r e s e n t  time, t h e r e b y  compensating for the loss  of time due  t o  sampling and v o t e r  
p r o c e s s i n g  . 
The v o t e r  d e s c r i p t i o n s  follow. 
Midvalue Select 
The midvalue select a l g o r i t h m  is commonly used i n  v o t e r  d e s i g n .  I t  p r o c e s s e s  
data q u i c k l y  and has  been used e x t e n s i v e l y  i n  synchronous envi ronments  ( refs .  5 
and 1 2 ) .  After e x e c u t i n g  t h e  f a u l t  d e t e c t i o n  r o u t i n e ,  M I D V A L  e s s e n t i a l l y  o u t p u t s  
t h e  middle v a l u e  of t h e  c o n t r o l s ,  hence the  t i t l e .  T h i s  e n s u r e s  t he  least  amount of 
"hopping" around from extremes, t h u s  o u t p u t t i n g  a somewhat c o n t i n u o u s  flow of data,  
r e l a t i v e l y  close t o g e t h e r .  
The basic idea of the  f a u l t  d e t e c t i o n  scheme is t o  first check for any f a u l t s  
or bad data ,  and then  to  isolate those detected from b e i n g  t h e  a c t u a l  c o n t r o l  v a l u e  
o u t p u t .  
s p e c i f i c  t o  the  a c t u a l  i n p u t  v a l u e s .  To check for t i m i n g - r e l a t e d  f a u l t s ,  the  v o t e r  
looks a t  those p i p e l i n e s  whose a s s o c i a t e d  time is w i t h i n  p l u s  or minus f o u r  frames 
(0.2 sec) of the p r e v i o u s  o u t p u t  frame. These are n o t  f a u l t e d .  But those whose 
time is g r e a t e r  t h a n  0.2 sec ahead or behind are c o n s i d e r e d  failed and are f l a g g e d  
a s  such .  The other,  more s i m p l e ,  t iming check fails  a p i p e l i n e  if  its time has n o t  
changed w i t h i n  20 frames (approximate ly  1 sec).  
F a u l t s  are detected by three d i f f e r e n t  tests--two t i m i n g  checks and one 
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To detect faults in the input signals, differences between pipelines are summed 
and averaged. This is done so as to compare each value to all the other values and 
see its relative "position." It is this value that is then checked against a prede- 
termined tolerance range of 4% of the signal amplitude for the specific control 
value. So as not to fail a control in a pipeline prematurely, the calculated aver- 
age must be out of the tolerance range for 20 frames before it is failed. (This 
number was arrived at through independent testing and has demonstrated itself to the 
designer as optimal.) 
In this voter, previously failed pipelines can be re-enabled. If the voter had 
failed because of its time, once the associated time comes back within +4 frame 
times of the current selected pipeline's time, its failed flag is changed back to 
unfailed. 
not within the tolerance level of the other working pipelines, it must come back 
within that tolerance and remain there for 40 contiguous frames (2 sec). 
To re-enable a pipeline that was failed because its relative average was 
After the fault detection routine, those pipelines that remain unfaulted are 
considered for signal selection. Midvalue select will continue to work until two 
failures have been detected; it is then recommended that the system be maintained 
since the detection of a third failure is impossible using this scheme. With this 
in mind, there are three different possible situations for signal selection: that 
in which all four lines are good; when one line is failed and three are good; and 
finally, when two failures have been detected and two lines remaln good. 
When all four lines are unfaulted, MIDVAL disregards the oldest (least recent) 
pipeline and chooses the middle value of the remaining three. 
pipelines, the middle value of the working lines is selected. In the situation of 
two failures, the most recent of the remaining two is selected. It is when these 
two remaining pipelines drift from one another that all confidence in system relia- 
bility is lost (ref. 8). 
For three working 
Residual Voter 
Fault detection in the residual voter, RESID, is based on the Taylor series 
second-order extrapolation. Each pipeline is extrapolated to the time of each of 
the other pipelines and their differences are compared with a user supplied error 
bound. This tolerance level was arrived at by experiments performed on the UFTCS. 
This technique was chosen so as to put the pipeline values at a common time to each 
other so their faults would become obvious. Each time a difference is noted to be 
greater than the tolerance level, the corresponding flag is set and, if the differ- 
ences between one pipeline and all the others exceed the tolerance level, then that 
pipeline is indicated as failed and is ignored for that specific frame. This voter 
monitors all pipelines every frame and sets the failure flag accordingly each frame; 
it does not necessarily permanently fail a pipeline. 
After the fault detection scheme, the voter chooses the unfailed pipeline with 
the most recent time associated with it as output. 
6 
First Order Extrapolation 
The first order extrapolator voter, FRSORD, bases both fault detection and 
signal output routines on the calculated slope of a signal. 
unfailed pipelines to a common time, FRSORD stores these data from the previous 
frame in a one frame history table and uses it in the calculation of the current 
slope. 
tolerance and, when the differences between one pipeline and the other unfaulted 
lines differ by more than the tolerance level, that pipeline is failed. Even though 
a pipeline is failed, the voter continues to monitor and process the pipeline every 
frame in the event that it returns to a good status. When this happens, the voter 
removes the failed flag and incorporates this now-good channel in its 
calculations. Another quick check performed to detect a time-related fault is to 
see if the value of the signals for all four sensors are equal or if the time has 
not been updated in a series of frames. These two quick checks also result in 
detected isolated failures that may later allow a pipeline to be resurrected. 
By extrapolating all 
The differences between the pipelines are compared to a previously set 
The output from this voter is the most recent unfailed pipeline extrapolated to 
This line was chosen because less the end of the frame (present time p l u s  50 msec). 
error is generally introduced when extrapolating shorter rather than longer 
distances. 
Second Order Extrapolation 
This voter, based on second-order extrapolation (SECORD) techniques, uses the 
Second same logic as FRSORD but keeps a history table of the two previous frames. 
order extrapolation calculates both the first and second derivatives and compares 
the pipeline differences with a previously set tolerance (like RESID). Pipelines 
are considered failed if the difference between the second-order extrapolation value 
of a control is greater than the tolerance level with the other working lines. This, 
routine does not fail a pipeline and isolate it for the remainder of the run, but 
rather continually monitors each pipeline and sets the failed flag true or false 
each frame. 
At the end of the routine, the most recent unfailed pipeline will be selected 
and the output is this line's extrapolated value to the end of the frame. The 
equations used to calculate for failures and output are as follows. 
MAYBFAIL(i,j) = SGNL(i,l) - SGNL(J,l) - SLOP(j,l)*dt 
OUTPUT(1) = SGNL(LATEST,l) + SLOP(LATEST,l)*dt + 
To be failed, MAYBFAIL is compared to the tolerance level 
appropriately. 
1 - 5*ACEL( j, l)*dtsq 
I -*ACEL(LATEST,l)*dtsq 2 
and the Gault flag is set 
7 
Third Order Extrapolator 
The third-order extrapolating voter executes the same logic as FRSORD and 
SECORD and uses the Taylor series expansion polynomial to the third order for its 
calculations. 
their associated times: Then 
with the new signal calculates the most recent slope, acceleration, and jerk, ;hen 
uses these in the third-order extrapolation calculation. The equations are: 
MAYBFAIL(i,j) = SGNL(i,l) - SGNL(j,l) - SLOP(j,l)*dt - z*ACEL(j,l)*dtsq 
TRDORD keeps a history table of three previous signal values and 
two previous slopes and the previous acceleration. 
1 
I - c*JERK( j, 1 )*dtcube 
OUTPUT ( 1 ) = SGNL ( LATEST, 1 + SLOP ( LATEST, 1 ) *d t + i*ACEL ( LATEST, 1 ) *d t sq 
1 
+ g*JERK(LATEST,l)*dtcube 
As in SECORD, the results of TRDORD's calculations determine failures and output for 
this voter. 
TEST DESCRIPTION 
Voter Simulator 
Exhaustive experimentation on the voting algorithms was not feasible in the 
UFTCS hardware because it would have been too expensive in time and it could not 
provide a quantitative means for comparing their performances. 
was designed to simulate the UFTCS environment for the voters and provide a means 
for analysis. This program was written in Fortran and implemented on the Intel 
Series I11 microcomputer development workstation. 
A software Frogram 
The program (also referred to as the simulator) simulates the voter configura- 
tion shown in figure 2 .  It included four separate pipelines, each containing the 
values and associated times for four simulated control functions, any of which could 
be faulted. The voter frame time is set at 50 msec. Each test continues with 
faults randomly interjected until three of the four pipelines actually are faulted 
or the voter indicates that three faults have occurred. 
The four control functions that were simulated are shown in figure 3 .  These 
functions were selected as being representative of the types of signals that a voter 
would act upon but do not represent actual control signals. 
functions shown in figure 3 were randomly phased. 
For the tests, the 
A sample of the simulation input and output parameters that were recorded at 
each frame is contained in table 1 .  
be discussed later) has been inserted on pipeline 2 and the SECORD voter is being 
For this example, a constant offset fault (to 
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TABLE 1 . -  SAMPLE FRAME OF SIMULATOR INPUT/OUTPUT PARAMETERS 
S-A-0 
RAND. INP. 
CON. DRIFT 
CON. OFFSET 
TRANSIENT 
S-A-X 
INPUT TO THE VOTER 
NO NO NO NO 
NO NO NO NO 
NO NO NO NO 
NO YES NO NO 
NO NO NO NO 
NO NO NO NO 
TIME 
CONTROL 1 
CONTROL 2 
CONTROL 3 
COMTFGL 4 
(a) 
PIPELINE 1 
2.900 
-13.125 
-0.732 
-0.752 
5.721 
SECORD VOTER OUTPUT 
TIME 2.963 
CONTROL 1 -15.251 
CONTROL 2 -0.329 
CONTROL 3 -0.752 
CONTROL 4 5.906 
(b) 
PIPELINE 2 
2.914 
-24.863 
-9.234 
-1 1.972 
-6.278 
CONTROL 1 
CONTROL 2 
CONTROL 3 
CONTROL 4 
PIPELINE 3 
2.913 
-13.427 
-0.631 
-0.752 
5.756 
PIPELINE 4 
INDICATED FAULTS 
PIPELINE 1 PIPELINE 2 PIPELINE 3 PIPELINE 4 
TIME 
CONTROL 1 
CONTROL 2 
CONTROL 3 
CONTROL 4 
2.891 
-12.986 
-0.751 
-0.752 
5.709 
SIMULATOR OUTPUT/TRUE VALUES AND STATUS 
NO YES NO NO 
NO YES NO NO 
NO YES NO NO 
NO YES NO NO 
2.963 
-15.236 
-0.337 
-0.752 
5.904 
1 2 3 4 FAULT TYPE 
tested. The i n p u t  parameters  (table la) i n c l u d e  t h e  time and associated f o u r  con- 
t r o l  v a l u e s  for  each of the p i p e l i n e s .  
pu ted  time as well as a summary of i n d i c a t e d  f a u l t s .  
f a u l t s  are shown i n  table I C .  
T a b l e  1b shows the v o t e r  o u t p u t s  and com- 
The a c t u a l  or t r u e  v a l u e s  and 
10 
Test Variables 
TO thoroughly test each of the voters' performances in the presence of faults, 
six specific fault characteristics were generated and implemented. 
all types of faults: 
those that can vary with time (ref. 10). 
They represent 
permanent, which are those invariant with time; and transient, 
The faults are: 
1. Stuck at zero 
2. 
3 .  Constant drift 
4. Constant offset 
5. Transient impulse 
6. Stuck at last value, with step 
Fault type 5 is referred to as a "soft" fault and typically occurs as a sudden 
short spike in the output. Since it is just a timewise short spike and does not 
remain in the signal, it should be isolated for the duration of the frame it occurs 
and not permanently failed. 
permanently isolated until appropriate maintenance has been performed. 
Random replacement of control function with control values 
The other five faults are "hard" faults and should be 
Tests were performed in a systematic fashion on all of the previously described 
voters to determine both their ability to detect faults and to output good values. 
These experiments were: 
1. Noiseless input, no faults injected 
2. Input with various levels of noise, no faults injected 
3 .  Noiseless input, each fault tested separately and randomly introduced in 
the pipelines 
4. Input with various levels of noise, each fault tested separately and ran 
domly introduced in the pipelines 
5. Input with noise and all faults allowed to occur 
The test results are based on identical experiments run on each voter. The 
statistics calculated were based on an average of 10 runs each. 
ited to 10 sec. The average run lasted 3 sec because the system becomes inoperable 
upon identification of three faults. 
Each run was lim- 
Data Analysis 
The statistical information recorded is for diagnostic and analytic purposes. 
Generated from each test are: 
11 
1. Average mean square error (AMSE) 
2. Fault detection ratio (FDR) 
3 .  False alarm ratio (FAR) 
4. Bad resurrection ratio (BRR) 
The average mean square error (AMSE) is relative to the true, noiseless value 
For pur- of the input function. 
pose of comparison, the AMSE is normalized to the maximum error of control fcnc- 
tion 2.  The fault detection ratio (FDR) is the ratio of the number of faults 
detzcted to the number of faults injected. 
FDR. 
faulted frames to the number of actually unfaulted frames. 
zero. A bad resurrection is when the voter properly detects a fault on a pipeline 
then later indicates that the fault is gone from the still-faulted pipeline. The 
bad resurrection ratio (BRR) is the number of frames a voter falsely resurrects a 
pipeline divided by the number of frames that pipeline actually is failed. 
The AMSE should be as close to zero as possible. 
A value of one would be perfect for the 
The false alarm ratio (FAR) is the ratio of the number of wrongfully indicated 
The FAR should be 
The following analysis of the voters' performances is based on these generated 
statistics, by analyzing them independently, and by comparison with each other. 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Because of the extent of the test data collected on all four control functions 
and the resulting lengthy analysis, the following discussion refers only to control 
signal two. This control function was similar to that of the UFTCS environment and 
the voters' performance on it was the most interesting. 
Noiseless Input/No Faults 
For the noiseless inputho-fault case, the AMSE should ideally be zero. Those 
voters that selected an input channel as output did best (as one would expect) 
because the clean input was simply passed through. The extrapolating voters, how- 
ever, were not as close to zero, but still predicted quite well with AMSE between 
0.02 and 0.201 on a wave form with an amplitude of 25.0 to 50.0 (see figs. 4 
and 5 ) .  The differences between FRSORD and SECORD were 0.1 in AMSE, but going from 
SECORD to TRDORD gained accuracy only in the fourth decimal place of the AMSE which 
is not worth the cost in computation time. 
adequate accuracy in the no noise case. 
In summary, all of the voters achieved 
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Noise Test 
The next set of tests consisted of a series of runs with still no faults 
injected but with various degrees of noise on the input signals. 
primarily conducted to determine the effectiveness of the different voters in 
selecting the signal or appropriate control value to pass on to the next task. The 
noise was randomly injected at levels of 15, 2.55, 5%, and 10% of the peak signal 
value. 
These tests were 
Results indicate that the MIDVAL and RESID voters perform substantially better 
than the extrapolating voters. This is illustrated in figures 6 and 7 which contain 
results for the SECORD and MIDVAL voters, respectively. The large errors evident 
with the SECORD voter are all due to the voter's attempt to extrapolate a noisy 
signal beyond its correlation time. The signal selection difference between the 
voters may not be as significant in the presence of highly correlated noise (rela- 
tive to the frame time). 
Fault Test 
The remainder of the experiments were performed to determine the voters' per- 
formances in the presence of various faults. For the sake of brevity, the results 
presented are for environments with up to 1% noise. The AMSE for each of the tests 
in the 1% noise environment is given in table 2. 
Stuck at zero- The next test was to determine the voters' ability to detect the 
stuck at zero fault. 
component resulting in a dead or flat signal. 
This common fault typically occurs when power ceases in a 
Based on the AMSE, all of the voters provided good controlling values in the 
event of this fault, with the worst being TRDORD which had a normalized error of 
0.02. 
of less than 5%, and a bad resurrection ratio of 0% (see table 3 ) .  
They all achieved a fault detection rate of at least 95%, false alarm rates 
Random input- The random-input fault (replacing control function values with 
random values) yielded interesting results. 
this fault could not reliably be detected because the noise and this particular 
fault are of the same characteristics. 
ment, RESID and the extrapolating voters performed well, reliably detecting the 
faults with 100% FDR and FAR of at most 5% (see table 4) .  Their reliable fault 
detection resulted in a good output of controlling values (see fig. 8). MIDVAL 
failed to reliably detect the faults because of its lenient fault detection schzme 
therefore allowing this voter to output a failed pipeline as the control values. 
This resulted in a large AWE. 
In the presence of noise 5% and above, 
However, in the no- and low-noise environ- 
Constant drift- One of the most difficult faults to detect is,when one pipeline 
drifts from the others. 
pipelines are working because they are each drifting away with respect to each 
other. 
This constant drift is hardest to detect when only two 
In figure 9, all four pipelines are relatively the same until some time 
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TABLE 2.- NORMALIZED AMSE IN 1% NOISE ENVIRONMENT 
NO FAULTS 
STUC K-AT-ZE RO 
RANDOM INPUT 
CONSTANT DRIFT 
CONSTANT OFFSET 
TRANSIENT IMPULSE 
MIDVAL RESID FRSORD SECORD 
0.00036 0.00058 0.00316 0.00440 
0.00221 0.00298 0.01 230 0.01809 
0.2016 0.0 1 42 0.01 14 0.0156 
0.0071 0.0188 0.0132 0.0206 
0.0285 0.028i 0.028i V.VO34 
0.00163 0.00615 0.01 26 0.0183 
n nnr- 
STUC K-AT-LAST 
OVERALL 
0.00262 0.1236% 0.0153 0.0195 
0.1759 0.1312 0.0286 0.0404 
TRDORD 
0.00465 
0.02047 
0.0195 
0.0208 
n nnnn 
U.UOUJ 
0.0198 
0.021 1 
0.0415 
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TABLE 3 . -  STUCK AT ZERO FAULT WITH 1% NOISE 
MIDVAL RESID FRSORD SECORD TRDORD 
1 .oo 1 .oo 1 .oo 1 .oo 
0.95 
I I 
FDR 
0.99 1 .oo 
0.967 0.965 1 .oo 
I 1 
I-FAR 
1 .oo 1 .oo 1 .oo 1 .oo 1 .oo 
I I 
I-BRR 
TABLE 4.- RANDOM INPUT FAULT WITH 1% NOISE 
MIDVAL RESID FRSORD SECORD TRDORD 
1 .oo 1 .oo 1 .oo 1 .oo 
FDR 
1 .oo 0.998 0.999 0.95 0.95 
I-FAR 
1 .oo 1 .oo 1 .oo 1 .oo 
0.92 
1 J 
I-BRR 
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Figure 9.- Constant drift fault. 
tl when pipeline 2 drifts away from the other three. 
fails this pipeline depends on the tolerance or variation allowance that was set. 
Most failure detection schemes will, at some point, detect this drift, its detection 
time being a function of the drift rate or a frame time allowance. 
the three remaining pipelines tracking, a drift fault on pipeline 4 becomes obv 3us 
at some time t2. 
pipelines, proper detection is impossible without extensive historical data to aid 
in prediction or prior knowledge to what the system is supposed to be doing. At 
time t3, is it pipeline 1 that failed or pipeline 3? To be able to confidently 
predict the continuance of the :'unction, the historical data must be lengthy, three 
or more frames, and requiring calculations too complex for our processing time 
restriction. It is this reason that all of the voters tested quit after two failure 
detections. 
The point at which the voter 
Likewise, with 
After this point, when a drift occurs on one of the two remaining 
As seen in table 5, the extrapolating voters and RESID performed reasonably 
well, RESID and FRSORD's FAR of 5% kept them from being near perfect and SECORD's 
FDR of 95% was its restrictor. 
FAR. In this case, it is obvious that as the order of extrapolation increases, so 
does the effectiveness of the performance. 
performance under this fault situation. 
high reliability system with FDR of only 73.7%. 
TRDORD was best with less than 2% BRR and 0.1% 
Figure 10 is an example of SECORD's 
MIDVAL's performance was too mediocre for a 
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TABLE 5.- CONSTANT DRIFT FAULT WITH 1% NOISE 
MIDVAL RESID FRSORD SECORD TRDORD 
1 .o 0.95 1 .o 1 .o 
0.737 
FDR 
0.997 0.999 0.95 0.95 1 .o 
I-FAR 
1 .o 0.986 0.97 0.986 
0.942 
I 
I-BRR 
? 
0 
F 
I 
3 n i w ~  
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Constan t  offset-  Another f a u l t  t h a t  proved d i f f i c u l t  for t h e  v o t e r s  to  detect  
was t h e  c o n s t a n t  offset f a u l t .  When p r e s e n t  on a channel ,  t h i s  f a u l t  does n o t  a l t e r  
t h e  form of t h e  s i g n a l ,  it simply offsets t h e  v a l u e  o f  t h e  s i g n a l s ,  t h u s  a l l o w i n g  
them to  c o n t i n u e  to track each o t h e r .  
T h i s  f a u l t  was tested w i t h  v a r i o u s  l e v e l s  of o f fse t .  The lower l e v e l s  o f  
o f fse t  tes ted,  2.5% to  105, y i e l d e d  very  low FDRs, h i g h  B R R s ,  and  i n  t h e  p r e s e n c e  of 
n o i s e  h i g h  FARs. The AMSE was comparable t o  t h e  l e v e l  o f  o f f s e t  i n j e c t e d .  
h i g h e r  l e v e l s  of offset ,  255, 50%, and loo%, produced b e t t e r ,  y e t  s t i l l  u n r e l i a b l e ,  
r e s u l t s .  Unl ike  t h e  c o n s t a n t  d r i f t  f a u l t ,  t h i s  f a u l t  s t a y e d  a c o n s t a n t  d i s t a n c e  
away from t h e  u n f a u l t e d  s i g n a l s ;  and,  when two c h a n n e l s  were f a u l t e d ,  w i t h o u t  e x t e n -  
s i v e  background data, v o t e r s  could  n o t  detect which set  of two c h a n n e l s  H a s  f a u l t e d  
and which was correct (see table 6 ) .  The e x t r a p o l a t i n g  v o t e r s  c o n t i n u e d  t o  u s e  them 
a l l ,  bouncing back and f o r t h  among tne cnanneis  ana  beyond. This resui ted  i n  a h i g h  
BRR and added t o  t h e i r  AMSE. RESID was better most of t h e  time, b u t  i t  d i d  hop back 
and f o r t h  some (see f i g s .  1 1  and 12) .  
The 
TABLE 6 . -  CONSTANT OFFSET FAULT WITH 1% NOISE 
MIDVAL RES1 D FRSORD SECORD TRDORD 
0.882 0.882 
0.70 
0.50 
0.35 
FDR 
0.997 0.998 0.951 1 .oo 0.946 
1-FAR 
0.964 
0.81 0.757 
I-BRR 
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The c o n s t a n t  offset f a u l t  was never r e l i a b l y  detected, p o s s i b l y  because of 
o v e r l y  l e n i e n t  t o l e r a n c e  l e v e l s .  In  t h e  smaller l e v e l s  of o f f se t ,  improper detec- 
t i o n  of t h i s  f a u l t  d i d  n o t  produce "bad" o u t p u t  s i g n a l s ,  b u t  s u f f i c e  it to  s a y  t h a t  
under none of t h e  c o n d i t i o n s  tested was t h i s  f a u l t  s a t i s f a c t o r i l y  isolated a n d ,  
therefore, none of these v o t e r s  is recommended for  u s e  i n  a sys tem wi th  t h i s  
c o n d i t i o n .  
T r a n s i e n t  sp ike -  T r a n s i e n t  impulses  or " g l i t c h e s "  occur  i n  most e v e r y  system. 
They are n o t  f a u l t s  i n  the  same s e n s e  as those p r e v i o u s l y  tested i n  t h a t  t h e y  are 
n o t  permanent. Their  d u r a t i o n  is t y p i c a l l y  less t h a n  one frame. Because o f  t h e  
lack of permanence, a p i p e l i n e  wi th  a t r a n s i e n t  p u l s e  p r e s e n t  should  be ignored  and 
n o t  failed permanent ly  by the v o t e r .  
f a i l u r e  t h a t  v o t e r s  ei ther wait s e v e r a l  frames t o  f a i l  a p i p e l i n e  o r  c o n t i n u o u s l y  
moni'cor a f a i l e d  l i n e  in case it i-.et-uI;i,s to a state* 
I t  is because  of t h e  n a t u r e  of t h i s  s o f t  
The tes'ts performed on the  v o t e r s  r e g a r d i n g  the  t r a n s i e n t  p u l s e  c o n s i s t e d  of 
i n j e c t i o n s  505, 301, and 5% of the c o n t r o l  f u n c t i o n  v a l u e  wi th  and w i t h o u t  n o i s e .  
The 5% impulse test  produced r e s u l t s  comparable t o  those w i t h  l i t t l e  and no n o i s e .  
I t  d i d  n o t  induce FAR or  al ter the M E .  
n o t i c e a b l y  affect  t h e  v o t e r  performance,  inducing  up t o  0.1% FAR i n  RESID under  t h e  
presence  of 0% n o i s e  (see f i g .  13). The tests wi th  t r a n s i e n t s  and n o i s e  main ta ined  
a h i g h e r  FAR (see table 7 )  b u t  r e s u l t s  d i s c u s s e d  earlier i n d i c a t e  t h i s  was due t o  
t h e  n o i s e  rather t h a n  t h e  t r a n s i e n t  i n j e c t i o n .  O v e r a l l ,  the v o t e r s  performed q u i t e  
well, w h i l e  n o t  premature ly  f a i l i n g  t he  r e s i d e . i t  p i p e l i n e  of t h e  impulses  b u t  rather 
i g n o r i n g  the s i g n a l  fo r  t h e  d u r a t i o n  of the  f a u l t .  
I t  took i n j e c t i o n s  of 30% and 50% t o  
S t u c k  a t  l a s t  wi th  s t ep -  The f i n a l  f a u l t  tested was the  s t u c k  a t  last  w i t h  s t e p  
2 I n  n --\  -L:- --__-_ 7 . . --- ..-_ ..LA- -.. rr..,nr.rn..e- -6- &kA ....- tA- 
L1,c.l ."-ab \v--n-a,. *. I*" "".,Y,.Y..LJ " " Y U I Y  V . L . W . .  I.." . ...-. - -v...y-..-..-- - *  -..- -.I -- --.. 
p i p e l i n e  f a i l  but  t h e  p i p e l i n e  c o n t i n u e s  to  o u t p u t  v a l u e s .  
a s tuck-a t -x  ( r e f .  8 ) .  
Th i s  v a l u e  is g e n e r a l l y  
To detect  t h i s  f a u l t ,  v o t e r s  u s u a l l y  i n c o r p o r a t e  a n  a d d i t i o n a l  d e t e c t i o n  mecha- 
nism for the s t u c k  clock. I f  t h e  o u t p u t  time has n o t  changed w i t h i n  s e v e r a l  frames 
p r e v i o u s l y  set by t h e  d e s i g n e r  based on the  performance e x p e c t a t i o n s  of t h e  r e s i d e n t  
sys tem,  t h e  p i p e l i n e  is failed. I t  is re-enabled o n l y  when the  time and v a l u e s  are 
v a l i d  a g a i n .  The s t u c k  s i g n a l ' s  d e t e c t i o n  is g e n e r a l l y  encompassed by the  o v e r a l l  
f a u l t  d e t e c t i o n  scheme; no s p e c i a l  test is s p e c i f i c a l l y  des igned  for t h i s  one f a u l t .  
I n  the  p r e s e n c e  of t he  s tuck-a t -x  f a u l t  (which is one of the  easiest f a u l t s  t o  
detect)  a l l  of the v o t e r s  performed reasonably  well (see table 8) e x c e p t  for FRSORD 
and RESID. 
tem. 
l e v e l s  of n o i s e ,  small s t e p  f a u l t s  were d i f f i c u l t  to  detect. 
i n t r o d u c e d  h i g h e r  FARs which also hampered the d e t e c t i o n  of the  s t u c k  f a u l t .  
and TRDORD a g a i n  performed the  b e s t  on  t h i s  f a u l t  with 100% FDR i n  1% n o i s e  and 50% 
s t e p  wi th  less t h a n  1% FAR and less than 5% BRR.  
t h i s  t y p e  of f a u l t  is SECORD or TRDORD. 
T h e i r  performances i n  FAR were s u b s t a n d a r d  for a h i g h  r e l i a b i l i t y  s y s -  
The AMSE a g a i n  reflected the v o t e r s  performance i n  f a u l t  d e t e c t i o n .  With h i g h  
Higher l e v e l s  of n o i s e  
SECORD 
Obviously,  t he  b e s t  scheme for 
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TABLE 7.- TRANSIENT IMPULSE WITH 1% NOISE 
MI DVAL RESID FRSORD SECORD TRDORD 
1 .o 0.999 0.999 0.973 0.973 
I-FAR 
TABLE 8.- STUCK AT LAST FAULT WITH 1% NOISE 
MIDVAL RESID FRSORD SECORD TRDORD 
1 .o 1 .o 1 .o 1 .o 0.95 
1 
FDR 
1 .o .-b n.. 0.998 1 .o 
0.889 
I 
I-FAR 
0.988 0.985 0.996 0.968 1 .o 
I-BRR 
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Average performance--all faults allowed- A final analysis was performed to 
determine the reliability of the voters subjected to all of the types of faults 
equally. These results are an average Of all of the tests run using each fault 
under each of 0, 1, and 2.5% noise conditions. 
The extrapolating voters performed best in FDR (see table 9 )  and FAR. 
Their BRR should be improved upon for high reliabil- 
In overall performance, the extrapolating voters are best 
This 
resulted in their low AMSEs. 
ity. MIDVAL was poor in FDR and its AMSE was intolerable because of this. The AMSE 
of RESID was also poor. 
with their consistent statistics. 
, 
, TABLE 9.- OVERALL AVERAGE PERFORMANCE (ALL FAULTS WITH 0, 1 ,  2.5% NOISE) 
MIDVAL RESID FRSORD SECORD TRDORD 
0.88 0.91 0.94 0.93 
0.74 
FDR 
0.98 0.99 
0.90. 0.92 0.98 
I J 
I-FAR 
0.965 
0.81 0.83 0.85 0.87 
I-BRR 
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CONCLUSIONS/RECOMMENDATIONS 
To design an effective voter requires extensive knowledge of the types of 
errors that may occur in the system and the nature of the signals being tested. The 
results presented in this paper are a first attempt to identify the attributes of 
alternative voter concepts as applied to the specific set of faults and signal/noise 
characteristics hypothesized for UFTCS. 
General Recommendations 
If the control signals are contaminated with high-frequency noise, it is found 
best to cnoose a given signai {as in riiij'v'iii or RESiD voters)  rather than to  extrapo- 
late the output. It was further found that the midvalue select provided a better 
choice for a given signal than the most recent signal, This is attributed to the 
inherent averaging in the middle value select method. 
formance was achieved using the extrapolator methods (providing the noise content 
was reasonably low). 
number of false alarms requires an extrapolation of the signals to a common time. 
High-frequency noise in the system will, however, significantly degrade the perfor- 
mance of these methods for fault detection. 
Improved fault detection per- 
In order to provide good fault detection rate with a low 
Specific to the Voters 
Midvalue select is a good signal selection routine. In noisy environments it 
does succeed in sifting out noise when faults have been properly detected. 
fault detection routine used in these experiments in the midvalue select voter was 
not sufficient for this job. 
But the 
The extrapolating voters were consistent in their performances throughout the 
experiments. While having higher AMSEs than the other voters because of magnifica- 
tion at the peaks of the input signals, they also had consistently good performance 
in fault detection (with the exception of constant offset fault, where none of the 
voters performed reliably). 
Specific to UFTCS 
Based on these tests, none of the voters considered were completely adequate 
for the UFTCS. The signal select voters did not provide adequate failure detection 
while the extrapolators provided poor signal selection in the presence of high fre- 
quency noise. This points toward a new voter design comprised of FRSORD, SECORD, or 
TRDORD for fault detection and isolation but using the MIDVAL voter logic for signal 
selection. To validate that these separate concepts can be brought together to form 
an effective voter for the UFTCS will require further testing. 
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